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Abstract
Specialty health care practices are unique in that they exhibit a wide range of ownership
types, from large corporations controlled by third parties to those directly owned by
practitioners (physicians, therapists, etc.). Many of these practices also employ licensed
assistants whose labor is partially substitutable with those of the practitioners. This paper
presents a theoretical model that examines the impact that different levels of ownership have
on rent-seeking behavior and efficiency within specialty practices. Our primary focus is on
whether lower levels of ownership induce practitioners to extract larger economic rents by
substituting their services for those of their assistants. We find that if the practitioners are not
required to be technically efficient then they unambiguously respond to lower ownership
with rent-seeking. However, requiring the firm to be technically (but not allocatively)
efficient, may be sufficient to mitigate this incentive.
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1.  Introduction
Rent-seeking is a common activity for economic agents.  When firms operate in imperfectly 
competitive markets, the owners and/or managers of these firms can make operating decisions 
that redistribute wealth from other members of society to themselves.  This produces allocative 
inefficiency and reduces social welfare below the optimal level.  The health care industry is no 
exception to this rule.  For example, a recent study by Town et al. (2006) estimated that between 
1990 and 2001, over $40 billion in consumer surplus was transferred from consumers to 
producers solely from mergers in the US hospital industry.  Given that hospitals are only one 
(albeit a major) subset of the health care industry, and that other producers may also practice rent 
reeking, the social welfare implications of rent seeking in health care are highly significant.
A crucial issue is to whom these potential rents accrue.  Firms operating in the health care 
industry are unique in that they have a wide array of ownership forms.  For example, a firm may 
be completely controlled by an outside, third party, or it may be (at least partially) owned by a 
group of individuals supplying a crucial service(s) (such as insurance, inpatient hospitals services 
and/or physician services) within the production process.  Since outside owners and medical 
personnel have different objectives, it stands to reason that the incentive to extract rents, as well 
as the allocation of those extracted rents, may differ depending on who owns the firm.
The literature on rent seeking in health care has been empirical
1, focused on physician 
behavior in general, acute care hospitals (particularly those that own, or are owned by, a HMO) 
and has attempted to identify whether various ownership structures lead to differences in rent 
seeking and efficiency.  The explanation posited by most of these studies is that certain 
ownership types have a vested interest in providing a particular type of care, and unnecessarily 
substitute that service for other types of medical care (whenever possible) in order to increase the 
monetary gain to the individual or group providing that service.  For example, Ahern et al. 
(1996) found that hospital-owned HMOs were more likely to over-utilize inpatient services than 
other types of HMOs.  In doing so, the hospital could garner a larger portion of the available net 
revenue per patient.  Unfortunately, by over-utilizing inpatient services to capture these rents, 
hospital-owned HMOs were necessarily less efficient than other HMOs.  Other studies have 
found similar results for a number of different hospitals types, including HMO-affiliated 
(Siddharthan et al. 1997; Rosenman et al. 1997; Hillman et al. 1999; Siddharthan et al. 2000) 
and non-HMO-affiliated hospitals (Kuntz and Vera 2003).  
Two recent trends have sparked renewed interest in rent seeking activity in health care.  
The first is the rapid proliferation of specialty care hospitals and medical practices (General 
Accounting Office 2003; Nallamothu et al. 2007).  These firms differ from general, acute care 
hospitals in that they provide only a small range of services (for example, coronary care, physical 
therapy or inpatient psychiatric services), are more likely to be for-profit, and also focus on a 
narrower range of patients, usually those covered by insurance policies that reimburse 
generously for the service(s) being performed.  Moreover, these firms also have 
disproportionately higher degrees of practitioner-ownership, which may increase the potential for 
rent seeking activity (Casalino et al. 2003).
The second trend is an increase in the use of variable inputs that exhibit a high degree of 
substitutability with a traditional practitioner’s labor.  For example, many firms (particularly 
                                                          
1 To the best of our knowledge, the only theoretical treatment of rent seeking in health care was conducted by Ahern 
et al. (1996), which provides only a simple, graphical analysis of how vertical integration allows for transfer-pricing 
and rent-seeking within an organization.2
those operating in the US and other industrialized nations) not only employ traditional medical 
practitioners such as physicians, pharmacists and therapists, but also licensed assistants (such as 
physician assistants, family nurse practitioners, pharmacy technicians, and physical and/or 
occupational therapy assistants) who are legally qualified to perform many of the same tasks as 
the practitioner under whom they work.  There is currently much debate in the medical literature 
about the role these licensed assistants should play in the delivery of medical care (Riportella-
Muller et al. 1995; Banham and Connelly 2002).  While some degree of substitutability is 
certainly desirable, issues of medical ethics, the quality of care provided to patients (assuming 
patients, on average, experience a higher real and/or perceived outcome when treated by the 
practitioner and not the assistant) and the increased potential for rent seeking activity may lead 
policy makers to review and possibly regulate the extent to which these licensed assistants are 
used, particularly in specialty care settings.     
To date, there has been little theoretical explanation about the impact of ownership on 
rent-seeking within specialty care practices that utilize both practitioner and licensed assistant 
labor.  Moreover, there has been no theoretical exploration of how the degree of firm ownership 
impacts (and potentially mitigates) the incentive to rent-seek.  This paper presents a theoretical 
model that examines the impact that different levels of practitioner ownership have on rent-
seeking behavior and efficiency within specialty practices.  Our primary focus is on whether 
lower levels of ownership induce practitioners to extract larger economic rents by substituting 
their services for those of their assistants.  In doing so, we provide some policy prescriptions 
which can be used to curb rent seeking behavior.  To the extent that the substitution of 
practitioner for assistant labor manifests itself in the quality of care (whether real or perceived), 
our analysis also allows us to theoretically characterize the relationship that exists between rent 
seeking, efficiency and the quality of medical care.  Thus, our analysis provides a theoretical 
rationale for why (and how) quality discrimination and cost adjusting might occur (Dor and 
Farley 1996; Friesner and Rosenman 2004; Rosenman, Friesner and Stevens 2005).   
2. A Simple Model of 3
rd Party Ownership
To establish a useful benchmark, we begin by modeling the third party ownership of a typical, 
for-profit specialty practice.  These owners do not supply factors of production, but instead 
purchase a quantity of “practitioner labor” (x1) and a quantity of “assistant labor” (x2) at prices 
W1(x1) and W2(x2), respectively.  We note in passing that if input markets are perfectly 
competitive then the input supply functions W1 and W2 are exogenously determined constants.    
The inputs are transformed into a single output (which we will define as “specialty health care 
services”) using a continuously (at least) twice-differentiable production function Q = f(x1, x2).
2  
We assume that f() satisfies all usual regularity conditions.  The firm has the ability to set prices 
in the output market, where the price is given by P= p(Q).  We further assume that p(Q) is (at 
                                                          
2 Clearly, the production of health services, even in specialty practices, is more complicated than the process 
described above.  Not only do these firms utilize fixed inputs such as office space and major equipment, but also 
other variable inputs, including (but not limited to) utilities and supplies.  However, because fixed inputs are not 
chosen by the firm and do not qualitatively impact the first order conditions of the model, we suppress these 
variables in the interests of parsimony.  Similarly, incorporating additional variable inputs will not change the signs 
of our comparative statics, and thus any policy implications derived from out model.  Lastly, in the case where a 
specialty firm provides a wider array of services, one can interpret our output measure as a weighted average of 
these different services, where the weights are defined by the severity of the illness being treated (for example, in 
terms of RBRVS units or case mix-adjusted admissions).  3
least) twice-differentiable, real-valued, and finite function for all non-negative values of Q.  The 
first derivative of P must also be non-positive for all allowable values for Q.
3  
Based on these assumptions, the firm’s profit function can be expressed as:
2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 ) ( ) ( ) , ( x x W x x W x x R     (1)
where R(x1, x2) is the firm’s revenue function, which can be represented as the product of the 
inverse demand and production functions:
R(x1,x2)  p(f(x1,x2)) f(x1,x2) (2)
The third-party owners are assumed to choose x1 and x2 to maximize profit.  Substituting (2) into 
(1), taking partial derivatives with respect to x1 and x2, and setting these expressions equal to 
zero gives the necessary first order conditions:
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The first term in equations (3) and (4) is the marginal revenue product of input xi, for i = 1,2 
while the second and third terms jointly represent the marginal factor cost for the practice.  One 





































































Let x1* and x2* denote the optimum demand for x1 and x2 derived from equations (3a) and (4a).  
Then assuming diminishing marginal returns, the smaller the value on the right-hand side of each 
equation, the larger the value of xi* for i = 1,2.
3. The Case of Constrained Practitioner Ownership
One interesting extension of the above problem is the case where one of the input suppliers 
(namely a group of practitioners) is a partial owner of the firm.  Because the practitioners now 
own part of the firm, they not only receive a share of its profits, but they also have the ability to 
determine input usage.  Moreover, as the practitioners alter the use of their own services, they 
move along the marginal revenue product curve for practitioner services, thereby altering their 
wage.  This last point is important, because it implicitly assumes that the practitioners have the 
ability to set the level of use for their input (or the price charged for their input) based on the 
demand curve for those services.  Thus, regardless of the degree of ownership, the practitioners 
are constrained in that they must choose a technically, but not necessarily allocatively efficient 
level of resource usage for the firm.  We define “unconstrained control” as the case where the 
                                                          
3 In a few cases, specialty care practices may derive the entirety of their revenues by treating patients covered by an 
insurance plan (such as Medicare) that reimburses solely on a fixed fee for service basis.  In that case, the firm 
cannot directly control the price it sets for its services.  This special case can easily be incorporated into our model 
without loss of generality by restricting P to a constant.4
practitioners have the ability to set prices based off of the supply curve for x1, and thus can 
induce both allocative and technical inefficiency.  This model is discussed in section 4.
Assuming that all of the firm’s practitioners act as a cohesive unit, the practitioners’ total 
return function consists of a share of the profit plus infra-marginal rents.  Defining this function 
as G(), these returns are given by:
  2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 ) ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ( x x W x x x MRP x x f x x f p G      

 
   
1
0 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 ) ( ) , (
x
dx x W x x x MRP (5)
where  is the (exogenously determined) share of physician ownership in the firm (which is 
normalized to the (0,1] interval) and W1(x1) is the supply function for the practitioners to provide 
their services.
4  In equation (5), the first bracket is simply the total amount of firm profit earned 
by the practitioners.  The second bracket represents the infra-marginal rents the practitioners are 
able to extract for their services.  Unlike marginal factor costs, the marginal revenue product will 
be a function of other inputs, since we assume that changes in the level of one of the inputs affect 
the marginal products of the other inputs; that is, the production function is not separable. Under 
these conditions, the practitioners will maximize their gain by setting the necessary first order 







































































































Since the wage is now determined by the firm’s demand curve, these equations do not match up 
with the third party ownership case.  However, to allow for a meaningful comparison across 







































































































































In section 5, we use comparative static analysis to determine how a small change in the 
share practitioner ownership affects input usage, and consequently rent-seeking activity.  
However, at this point it is interesting to consider the two discrete cases: where  is either one or 
less than one.  We begin with the case where  equals one; that is, where the practitioners receive 
all of the firm’s profit.  In this case (6a) and (7a) simplify to:
                                                          
4 Note that W1 actually represents the practitioners’ opportunity costs.  As such, there is no reason to consider the 
portion of the W1 curve above the practitioners’ actual opportunity cost since the firm will decide input usage based 





























































Equation (6b), when compared to (3a) indicates that the firm will use more of x1, or practitioner 
services, than in the case of third party ownership.  Since the numerator of (6b) is smaller than 
that of (3a), the optimal value of the marginal product must be smaller.  Given diminishing 
returns, the optimal level of x1 must also be higher.  In the third party case, the firm has 
monopsony power.  As a result, the marginal revenue product of practitioner services is greater 
than the opportunity cost for practitioners at that point.  Since the practitioners can act as perfect 
wage discriminators for themselves, they will increase profit, as well as their rents, by increasing 
the use of x1 until its marginal revenue product is equal to the opportunity cost for practitioners.  
Equations (7b) and (4a) are exactly the same in form.  However, since the optimal level 
of x1 has changed, the values for (7b) will likely be different than those of (4a).  As a result, 
whether the optimal level of x2 is higher or lower under third party ownership is an empirical 
issue.
To the extent that greater net use of practitioners enhances the quality of care (whether 
real or perceived), these findings imply that full practitioner ownership, in the majority of cases, 
leads to both more rent seeking and higher quality of care.  The practitioners unambiguously use 
more of their own services, and may or may not use fewer licensed assistants.  If both inputs are 
increased, quality is made unambiguously better off.  Quality of care is also increased, albeit to a 
lesser extent, if licensed assistant use is decreased, but the decrease is disproportionately smaller 
than the increase in practitioner usage.  It is only when the potential decrease in licensed 
assistants outweighs the increase in practitioner use that there is a concern about the quality of 
care offered to patients.   
Now consider the case where  < 1.  Here the practitioners may want to charge a higher 
price for their services than when they fully own the firm.  Although the amount of x1 will 
decrease, as will the firm’s profits, the practitioners gain more rents than before.  Again, this 
becomes an empirical issue.  For certain values of x1, the increased rents will offset the loss in 
practitioner profits.  However, other values of x1 lead to less rent-seeking because the gain in 
profitability offsets the incentive to rent-seek.  
As for the use of input x2, the denominator on the third term is larger than that of the 
second term.  Meanwhile, both terms have the same numerator.  If the two inputs are substitutes 







 is negative), then the firm will use more x2 than when  is one.  If 







 is positive), then the firm will use 
less x2.  Thus, whether there is a positive or negative relationship between rent seeking activity 
and the quality of care is a fundamentally empirical issue, depending on both revenue conditions 
as well as the substitutability/complementarity of the two inputs.   
4. The Case of Unconstrained Practitioner Ownership
We also wish to examine the case where the practitioners have an ownership stake and 
unconstrained control over input usage in the sense that they can set both the price and the 
quantity of the firm’s inputs.  The price of the input is now determined along the practitioners’ 6
supply curve; thus we use W1 instead of MRP1 when determining the price of x1.  As such, the 
firm can be both technically and allocatively inefficient.  This creates a new profit function for 
the practitioners (which we define as H()), as shown below:
  2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 ) ( ) ( ) , ( )) , ( ( x x W x x W x x f x x f p H      

 
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dx x W x x W (8)















































































  = 0 (10)
































































































     (9a, 10a)





 in the case of unconstrained practitioner ownership is smaller than the third party case as 
long as the practitioners have some ownership stake.  With diminishing marginal returns, this 
means the level of x1 is larger regardless of the magnitude of  (as long as  is positive).  Unlike 
the constrained case, the wage earned by x1 when practitioners have unconstrained control 
increases as the level of x1 increases, since the wage is determined by the supply curve.  As a 
result, the rents actually increase for the input-suppliers of x1.  As long as these rent-seeking 
gains are greater than the loss in profit for the firm, the input-supplier will continue to increase 
x1.  Meanwhile, equation (4a) and (10a) are identical in form.  However, with a different level of 
x1 being chosen, we expect the level of x2 to differ as well.  Whether this is an increase or a 
decrease is an empirical issue.  As long as the use of licensed assistants either increases, or 
decreases a sufficiently small amount, then rent seeking will lead to equal or higher quality care.  
It is only when the decrease in licensed assistant hours outweighs the increase in practitioner 
hours that there is any concern about a reduction in the quality of care.  
5. A Comparative Static Analysis
We are now in a position to not only examine how a change in the degree of practitioner 
ownership affects the incentive to rent-seek, but also to determine whether and how these 
marginal incentives differ across each of our models.  Our key parameter of interest is the level 
of ownership by the practitioners, .   We begin by creating comparative statics for our 
constrained ownership model.  As shown in the appendix, the comparative statics of interest are 











G 11G22  G12G21
(12)
where G1, G2, G11, G22, G12 and G21 are defined in the Appendix.  7
In general, both of these expressions are ambiguous in sign.  However, we can identify 
some general conditions under which each of these expressions is unambiguously signed.  The 
denominator for both (11) and (12) is the stability condition for a maximization problem, which 
must be unambiguously positive.  G11 and G22 must also be unambiguously negative to ensure 
that the objective function is maximized.  As such, the sign of (11) is determined by the signs 
and relative magnitudes of G1, G2 and G12.  The first two terms are the marginal profitability of 
x1 and x2, respectively, while the last term is the impact of a change in x2 on the marginal net 
benefit of x1.  As discussed earlier, the practitioners in this problem have an incentive to over-
utilize x1, making G1 negative in sign.  This also makes the first set of terms in the numerator of 
(11) negative.  Thus, if G2 and G12 are opposite in sign, then (11) is unambiguously negative, 
and practitioners react to lower levels of ownership by over-utilizing x1.  In short, the 
practitioners are rent-seeking.  The same is true if G2 and G12 are the same sign, but the product 
of these terms is smaller in magnitude than – G1G22.  The only time no rent seeking occurs is 
when G2 and G12 are the same sign, and the product of these terms is greater in magnitude than 
– G1G22.  Whether this last event occurs depends on the complementarity or substitutability of 
the two inputs in the production process.  If the inputs are highly substitutable, then decreasing 
practitioner ownership would likely lead to more rent seeking, as it allows the practitioners a 
greater ability to over-utilize x1 in order to recoup lost profit.  Higher levels of complementarity 
would allow for less over-utilization (and thus a positive sign for (11)), especially when 
ownership is low or declining.        
The sign of (12) also depends on the signs and relative magnitudes of G1, G2 and G12.  
However, in this case the only time when (12) is clearly positive is when G2 is positive and G12
is negative.  And when G2 is negative and G12 is positive then (12) is negative.  All other 
possibilities lead to ambiguous results.  In both of these cases, the sign of (11) is negative, 
implying that rent seeking occurs.  So whether rent seeking leads to more or less use of the other 
input (x2) depends on whether the two inputs are substitutes or complements in the production 
process, and also how this relationship impacts the marginal profitability of both inputs.         
In general one would expect that as ownership share increased, the value of any extracted 
rents would begin to disappear, as these rents become more of a dollar for dollar transfer 
between the two sources of income.  Meanwhile, the loss of profit from the inefficient choice of 
inputs would become a larger loss for the practitioner owners.  Therefore, the practitioners would 
increase the use of x1 until it reached the level of use for perfect competition.  Again, while a 
fundamentally empirical issue, these findings that, unless the practitioners and their assistants 
exhibit extremely high degrees of complementarity, rent seeking is likely to result in higher (real 
and/or perceived) quality of care offered to patients.
There are also comparative statics for the case of unconstrained ownership.  As shown in 













where H1, H2, H11, H22, H12 and H21 are defined in the Appendix.  
As in the constrained problem, the denominator for both (13) and (14) is the stability 
condition for a maximization problem, which must be unambiguously positive.  H11 and H22
must also be unambiguously negative to ensure that the objective function is maximized.  Since 8
the practitioners over-utilize x1 relative to the pure profit maximization case, H1 must also be 
negative.  The primary difference between the constrained and unconstrained cases is that we can 
now sign H2.  As long as  is positive, (10) guarantees that H2 = 0.  As such, the sign of (13) is 
unambiguously negative.  That is, in the unconstrained problem practitioners always rent-seek 
when their ownership share declines.  The sign of (14) is ambiguous, and depends on conditions 
analogous to those for signing (12).  The only time when (14) is clearly positive is when H2 is 
positive and H12 is negative.  And when H2 is negative and G12 is positive then (14) is negative.    
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications
In this paper, we investigate whether increasing or decreasing the degree of firm ownership 
increases or decreases the likelihood of rent-seeking on the part of practitioners.  In general, we 
find this relationship to be ambiguous, particularly when the practitioners must ensure that the 
firm is technically efficient.  On the other hand, when the firm can be both allocatively and 
technically efficient, the practitioners unambiguously respond to lower ownership levels by 
increased rent-seeking.  
Our findings present several implications for policy makers and administrators.  First, 
administrators have both a “carrot” and a “stick” to prevent practitioners from rent-seeking.  The 
“stick” involves penalties for practitioners who waste resources.  By focusing on waste reduction 
policies, practitioners are constrained to be less technically inefficient, and thus less likely to 
rent-seek.  The “carrot” is simply to give practitioners a larger ownership share in the firm.  Our 
study suggests that rent-seeking is a response to a reduction in practitioner ownership.  Thus, if 
practitioner ownership increases, there is less incentive to rent-seek, since rent-seeking reduces 
profitability.
A second implication is that the type of medical care offered by the firm is crucial in 
whether or not rent-seeking occurs.  Rent seeking is much less likely when inputs are not 
substitutable.  Thus, rent-seeking is much more likely in firms providing multiple, but similar 
types of specialized care.  This may be the reason, for example, why rent-seeking is likely to 
occur when firms provide both ambulatory and inpatient services (Ahern et al. 1996).  
Additionally, policy makers may be able to mitigate (or enhance) rent seeking activity by 
limiting the tasks licensed assistants can legally perform, thereby reducing their substitutability 
with practitioners.
A third implication is that policy makers need to be careful when designing policies to 
reduce rent seeking and enhance firm efficiency.  To the extent that higher use of practitioners 
leads to higher real or perceived quality of care, the profit that is transferred to practitioners and 
the resulting inefficiency incurred by the firm may ultimately create benefits in the form of better 
patient care.  However, a crucial issue in whether rent seeking leads to higher quality depends on 
i) what aspects of quality are important to administrators and policy makers and ii) the 
complementarity/substitutability of the practitioners and their assistants.  Future work to 
empirically identify the nature of the rent-seeking/quality tradeoff in specific types of health care 
practices would provide valuable insights about whether and how this welfare transfer impacts 
patient care.    9
Appendix: Creating the Comparative Statics
















Totally differentiating (A1) and (A2):
dG1 = G11dx1 + G12dx2 + G1d = 0 (A3)









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In order to guarantee that the objective function is maximized, G11 and G22 must both be 
negative.  Additionally, while symmetry requires that G12 = G21 the signs of these expressions 


















  d (A11)











G 11G22  G12G21
(A13)
Comparative statics for the unconstrained problem can be created in an analogous 















Taking the total differential, we find:
dH1 = H11dx1 + H12dx2 + H1d = 0 (A16)


































































































































































































































































































































































As before, in order to guarantee that the objective function is maximized, H11 and H22 must both 
be negative.  Additionally, while symmetry requires that H12 = H21 the signs of these expressions 
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